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1 Introduction
Probability claims are a familiar feature of our lives. From weather reports predicting a forty percent chance
of rain over the course of the day (which are commonly misunderstood) to the favorite in a football match,
most of us are exposed to at least a handful of claims ascribing odds or probabilities every day. From a
philosophical perspective, the interpretation of such claims formed a signicant problem for twentieth-
century philosophy of science and mathematics. What exactly does it mean to ascribe a probability to the
occurrence of an event, or a credence or partial belief in a particular proposition? Is there just one way to
formalize reasoning with these quantities? Can their meanings, or their grounds, all be interpreted in the
same way, or ought we instead be pluralists about the notion of probability? How does our ability to reason
with probabilities interface with traditional metaphysical problems of determinism and indeterminism?
All these questions remain open, the subject of a large and complex literature.
Two trends conspired to place this challenge on the philosophical agenda. First, while probability had
been a topic of discussion in both mathematics and philosophy since the seventeenth century, it was over
the course of the rst few decades of the twentieth century that the formal basis of probability theory
was elaborated, claried, and axiomatized in what is now considered the “classic” approach to probability
theory (culminating most famously in the Kolmogorov axioms, Kolmogorov 1933). Philosophers thus found
themselves furnished with a formalism that seemed to be in need of interpretation. Coherent probabilistic
reasoning could be carried out in the way that Kolmogorov described, but what facts about the world make
that reasoning possible?
Second, the development of quantum mechanics seemed, at least to many interpreters, to indicate that
probabilistic reasoning – rather than being the isolated province of games of chance or contrived cases like
coin-ips – takes on important, fundamental roles in our best physical theories. Probabilities, it seems,
are in some sense “out there,” and this in turn seems to imply that our best work in the philosophy of
physics or the metaphysics of science needs to be informed by work on the interpretation of these objective
probabilities.1
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1Of course, there is dispute here, as well, including entirely subjectivist interpretations of quantummechanics on which there is
no role at all for objective probability (Fuchs and Peres 2000). As a matter of historical fact, however, much early work on objective
theories of probability was powered by a desire to explain the apparently irreducible probability statements arising in quantum
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For Karl Popper, close consideration of the role of probability in science revealed a dangerous sort of
instability at the heart of much scientic reasoning – starting, but by no means ending, with that in
fundamental physics. Transitions between objective readings of probability (on which probabilities are
mind-independent facts about the physical world) and subjective readings of those same probabilities (on
which probabilities are measures of an agent’s knowledge) are regularly made, Popper thought, without
being clearly addressed. “In this way,” Popper writes, “a kind of double-talk has arisen in physics, both in
statistical mechanics and in quantum theory; and at times we nd objective physical facts ‘explained’ by
our lack of knowledge” (Popper 1983, 301).2
How do we resolve this? Popper’s broad goal is to advance a novel interpretation of objective probability,
which he would call the propensity interpretation.3 On this view, objects in the world have dispositions
or tendencies to bring about or realize certain kinds of future possible outcomes. We can then measure
those dispositions by observing the relative frequencies of the outcomes that result – those measures of
possibilities are probabilities. Popper would then combine this interpretation with the further argument
that all other interpretations of probability are either incoherent (e.g., subjective views), or justied in some
cases by their connections to the more fundamental propensity interpretation (e.g., long-run frequency
views). e result is a singular, unied understanding of all uses of probability – or, at least, all uses of
probability worth having.
My goal here is to describe this interpretation, introduce some of the arguments that Popper believed
motivated it, briey consider some of its complexities, and connect it to other contemporary work. I will
begin in section 2 by introducing Popper’s comparison between objective and subjective interpretations of
probability, and a few of the reasons for which he rejects both subjective probabilities and most uses of long-
run frequency interpretations. In section 3, then, I will present and discuss the propensity interpretation
itself. e following two sections are devoted to objections and clarications – section 4 considers just
what it is that propensities are supposed to be properties of, and section 5 explores the relationship between
propensities and the mathematical axiomatization of probability theory. Finally, in section 6, I conclude by
briey considering what a Popperian propensity view might oer to contemporary work in philosophy of
biology.
2 Comparing Interpretations
Given the diversity of interpretations of probability in the literature, a protable way to start unpacking
Popper’s position on thematter is to look at the comparisons he drew between those diering interpretations.
In the end, it is clear that for Popper, the real philosophical interest lies in propensity interpretations of
probability but to get there, we need to look at the arguments he makes against that interpretation’s
competitors.
Popper was by no means a pluralist concerning interpretations of probability. First and foremost, he con-
tended at length, from a variety of dierent starting points, that all subjective interpretations of probability
were doomed to fail.4 According to subjective interpretations of probability, on Popper’s use of the term,
mechanics (Popper 1983, 398–400). I will endeavor to avoid questions in the interpretation of quantum mechanics in what follows,
despite their importance to Popper (volume cross-reference).
2I will largely cite from Popper (1983), which combines revised versions of a variety of Popper’s other papers on the propensity
interpretation (including, e.g., Popper 1957, 1959).
3Charles S. Peirce proposed a similar interpretation of probability in 1910, in which he argued that a statement of probability
about a die “means that the die has a certain ‘would-be’; and to say that a die has a ‘would-be’ is to say that it has a property, quite
analogous to any habit that a man might have” (Peirce 1932, 664).
4For reasons of space, I am passing over Popper’s discussion of the logical interpretation of probability, for him an interpretation
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all probability statements make reference to degrees of belief or credences (whether of actual or of ideally
rational agents). e claim, for instance, that the probability of a is x, Pr(a) = x, just amounts to a claim
like “my current degree of belief in a is x,” or “the rational degree of belief in a would be x.” Conditional
probability statements, then, that the probability of a given b is x, Pr(a ∣ b) = x, express something like
the claim that the rational degree of belief in a given a current set of total evidence b is x.5 e function of
probability theory, on such an interpretation, is to establish conditions for the rationality of our judgments
about these credences. How should I change them in response to new evidence? How should I answer
when complex questions are posed to me about the content of those beliefs?
It is clear that a number of dierent “subjective” interpretations of probability could be defended – depending
on exactly what kinds of agents one permits, what kinds of further restrictions one places upon the formation
of and change in their credences over time, and so forth. For my purposes here, and largely because Popper
himself did not oen specify such details, we can rest content with this schematic presentation.
Subjective theories, then, are to be contrasted with objective theories of probability. On objective interpre-
tations, probabilities are facts about certain kinds of physical systems out there in the world. A probability
statement, Pr(a ∣ b) = x, expresses a claim like “the probability of obtaining outcome a in the experimental
conguration b is x.” ese probability claims have nothing to do with degrees of belief, collections of
evidence, or any other properties of agents – they are mind-independent, empirical assertions.
Let’s consider a few of Popper’s arguments against the coherence of subjective probabilities. He starts by
noting that theories of objective and subjective probability, as a rule, are conditionalizing upon radically
dierent sorts of things. When we talk about an objective statement of probability, Pr(a ∣ b), the sentence
b on which we conditionalize is usually a statement of experimental conditions – whatever the repeatable
set-up is that gives rise to the relevant probabilistic outcomes (though more on this in section 4). A
subjective interpretation of a similar statement, Pr(a ∣ b) will, on the other hand, usually be a statement of
the subjective probability of a given our total knowledge at the moment, and thus b will instead represent
our current total knowledge (Popper 1983, 297–98).
In order to act upon such a subjective probability, Popper argues, we need some kind of rule – he calls this a
rule of absolution, and notes thatmodus ponens serves a similar role in classical logic (Popper 1983, 308–9)
– that lets us move from an assertion of a conditional probability on the basis of our current knowledge,
Pr(a ∣ b) = x, to an assertion of an unconditional probability, Pr(a) = x, which holds at least for present
purposes. at is, we need a way to move from the claim that “given our present knowledge b, the rational
level of credence to place in a is x” (a statement, Popper contends, of an analytic connection between the
nature of the total knowledge b and the proposition a) to the stronger claim that “our actual credence in a
(at least for now) is x.”6
on which probabilities measure something like the amount of logical space consistent with a proposition (tautologies having
probability 1, contradictions probability 0, etc.). Probability statements, on such an interpretation, become analytic claims about
the proposition at issue (or analytically claims about a proposition within a given framework), a position that was defended by,
among others, Carnap (who in Carnap 1962 and elsewhere calls such a notion “probability1”). Popper argues that this interpretation
is indeed consistent, but almost never useful in practice.
5If the reader notes a bit of conation here between (what are today commonly called) logical or evidential and subjective
interpretations of probability (e.g., in Hájek 2019), they are quite right. Because Popper believes that all subjective interpretations
of probability are parasitic, in the end, on the logical interpretation in his sense (see the previous footnote), he is occasionally
sloppy in moving back and forth between, in the words of Hájek (2019), “an epistemic concept, which is meant to measure
objective evidential support relations” (evidential probability) and “the concept of an agent’s degree of condence, a graded belief ”
(subjective probability).
6is is similar to what David Lewis would later go on to formalize as the Principal Principle (1980), although moving not
from an expert function or an objective source of chances to credences, but rather from, in modern terms, evidential probabilities
to credences.
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Contemporary subjectivists about probability, notably, do not usually assert such a rule of absolution
directly. In general, on the contrary, they produce what are known as Dutch book arguments – a series
of bets demonstrating that, should one fail to act upon one’s best available credence at the time (updated
according to the axioms of probability theory and Bayes’ rule), one can be forced to take a number of wagers
guaranteed to lose money, demonstrating a sort of probabilistic irrationality (Jerey 2004).
However the subjectivist decides to complete the story, though, Popper believes that they are making a
basic mistake. For what makes a probabilistic situation repeatable – and hence, the kind of thing about
which we can obtain evidence and make inferences – is oen not the use of total knowledge b, but instead
“the conscious neglect of available relevant information.” He continues:
is is due to the fact that b is considered as dening repetitive experimental conditions, rather
than as a summary of our total relevant knowledge. What the insurance oce tries to do [in
estimating probabilities of adverse events] is nd a reasonably stable r [probability value] for a
not too specic b. is procedure contrasts very sharply with the subjective theory according
to which b constantly grows and r, consequently, constantly changes. (Popper 1983, 311)
In short, the requirement of subjective theories to conditionalize on total knowledge renders them useless
as practical guides to action, because it fails to recognize that it is experimental set-ups, limited in scope,
on which we must conditionalize in order to produce the kind of repeatability and stability necessary for
probabilistic inference. (I will return below to whether or not Popper actually carries through with this
admonition – his own construction of those experimental set-ups makes his argument here problematic in
important ways.)
Turn now to objective theories of probability. Popper acknowledges several other competing theories of
objective probability – as he notes, when he initially approached the subject in writinge Logic of Scientic
Discovery (Popper 1992, originally published in 1935), he was himself a long-run frequency theorist. His
mature view, however, is that long-run frequency theories are essentially parasitic on propensity theories.
Why would this be so? Consider the following kind of probabilistic experiment. We are planning to roll a
fair die very many times. For this die (call the experimental set-up for such a fair roll f ), of course, the
probability of rolling six (s) is one in six, Pr(s ∣ f ) = 1/6. Imagine, then, that precisely three times within
this very long sequence of rolls, we will roll a biased die (b), for which Pr(s ∣ b) = 1/4. What, then, is the
overall probability of rolling a six in this long, combined sequence? Intuitively, it is something slightly
greater than 1/6.
But why do we know this? Again intuitively, it is because of what we know about the probability of rolling
a six with the biased die. But, Popper asks, if one is a long-run frequency theorist, on the basis of what
long sequence of trials does one infer this? In this experimental set-up, we lack a long sequence of rolls
of b – by hypothesis, we only roll b three times during our experiment. What we will do in practice, he
argues, is bring in further information about the die, whether its physical construction, probabilities gained
from a separate long sequence of tosses of the biased die, or other such features derived from beyond
our experiment. In doing so, Popper claims, we will make the probabilities at issue be grounded not just
in the properties of a single long sequence of dice rolls, but rather in something like “a set of conditions
whose repeated realization produces the elements of an independent sequence” (Popper 1983, 355). But
precisely this move – the introduction of further information about the experimental set-up responsible for
generating the probabilities involved – constitutes a transition from a frequency theory to a propensity
interpretation, Popper’s own preferred understanding of objective probability. It is high time that we
introduce that interpretation.
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3 e Propensity Interpretation
For Popper, the intuition that launches the propensity interpretation is one that is shared by almost all
interpretations of objective probability – probability is in some sense a measure of the possibilities present
to a system congured in a particular way. When we say that the probability of our fair die rolling six is
one in six, we mean something roughly like “of all the possible throws that could occur at the moment,
one in six of them results in rolling a six.” On a propensity interpretation, these possibilities are “not mere
abstractions but physical tendencies or propensities to bring about the possible state of aairs – tendencies
or propensities to realize what is possible” (Popper 1983, 286). Relative frequencies, rather than grounding
probabilities directly, are the way in which we are able to measure these propensities. As Popper puts it,
they “can be considered as the results, or the outward expressions, or the appearances, of a hidden and not
directly observable physical disposition or tendency or propensity” (Popper 1983, 286).
is obviously leaves us with an important interpretive problem – what exactly are these properties, and
what are they properties of? If the propensity interpretation is to be objective, they must clearly be mind-
independent features of the world – “I conjecture,” Popper writes, “that these propensities are physically
real in the sense in which, say, attractive or repulsive forces may be physically real” (Popper 1983, 286–87).
ese, in turn, are properties of “the experimental condition, the experimental set-up” (Popper 1983, 290).
(I will return to a more detailed analysis of the nature of propensities in the next two sections.)
What makes such an interpretation attractive – that is, what kind of benet do we receive in exchange for
introducing propensities into our ontology? Popper believes it primarily relates to our understanding of
singular probability statements, such as “the next roll of this die will be a six.” On a long-run frequency
interpretation, these statements onlymake sense insofar as that single roll is a part of a longer series of dice
rolls. But on the propensity interpretation, because the propensities are properties of the experimental
set-up, the single roll is “a representative of a virtual or conceivable sequence of events” that could be
generated by the setup, “rather than. . . an element of an actual sequence” (Popper 1983, 287). Probabilities
can thus be traced back to the very character of the experimental set-up that leads to their occurrence.
Popper also argues that – just like the proposition of elds of force in physics – there is a sort of conceptual
or interpretive utility derived from postulating the existence of propensities. Both elds of force and
propensities
draw attention to unobservable dispositional properties of the physical world, and thus help in
the interpretation of physical theory. Herein lies their usefulness. [. . . ] [T]hey suggest that the
theory is concerned with the properties of an unobservable physical reality and that it is only
some of the more supercial eects of this reality which we can observe, and which thus make
it possible for us to test the theory. (Popper 1983, 351)
is, somewhat vague though it may be, is Popper’s version of the propensity interpretation of probability.
Certain kinds of objects (or, better, experimental set-ups) in the world are possessed of physically real
dispositional properties. ese properties manifest themselves whenever the experiment is performed,
and can be measured (or, put dierently, hypotheses about their nature can be tested) by observing the
frequencies of the outcomes that result.
Fine as far as it goes – and Popper believed that it goes quite far, particularly in resolving some of the
paradoxes of quantum mechanics, too technical a subject for me to enter into here in detail. But a number
of questions about these propensities remain, to which we now turn.
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4 e Nature of Propensities
As Antony Eagle has noted, there are a variety of dierent ways in which we might specify the details of
a propensity interpretation of probability, and “Popper’s original paper actually contained hints of all of
the dierent forms that the interpretation would take” (Eagle 2004, 374). Let’s investigate a few of these
unspecied details, and consider some of the ways in which they might be lled in.
To begin, what kind of property is a propensity? At the very least, it must not be a categorical property
– that is, it must be some sort of tendency or disposition. We would like to say that a properly designed,
fair dice-rolling experiment that is built and then destroyed before ever rolling a single die still had the
propensity to produce the outcome ‘six’ one-sixth of the time. at is, it was disposed or it had the tendency
to produce that outcome at that frequency. is is in line with traditional depictions of dispositional
properties – in the classic example, a piece of salt is disposed to dissolve in water (it is soluble) even if it
never in fact comes in contact with any water.
But tendencies and dispositions – in Popper’s own words, a “physical disposition or tendency or propensity”
– can be grounded in a variety of ways, and the character of those dispositions will have important impacts
on how we understand the propensity interpretation of probability. To take just one example, consider
the way in which one’s theory of dispositions handles so-called nkish dispositions (Eagle 2004, 389–90).
ese are dispositions the manifestation of which modies their basis in such a way as to “cancel out” their
eects – so we could truly say that an object was disposed to act in a certain way, but we could never detect
that manifestation, because it would be cancelled out every time we tried to manifest it (Lewis 1997). For a
propensity-based example, imagine a die that, if never rolled, is disposed to land fairly, but once rolled,
will only show six. Before rolling the die, we want to say that its probability to land six is 1/6 (because it
is indeed disposed to land fairly), but whenever we roll it, we will nd that it always lands six (and hence
its long-term frequency of sixes will be 1). Finkish dispositions spawned a massive literature, and have
been treated in radically dierent ways by dierent understandings of dispositional properties. Perhaps,
for instance, the problem of nkish dispositions is resolved by making dispositional property ascriptions
contextually sensitive (see Choi 2011 for skeptical discussion of this approach) – in which case there is
no question of nkish propensities, but there is a question of context-sensitive probability ascription, a
dierent kind of interpretive challenge.
Whatever one might in the end conclude about the nkish disposition case, the example demonstrates
clearly enough that any propensity interpretation of probability has more work to do in laying out an
account of the dispositional properties that it invokes. Similarly, we also are owed an account of just
what these propensities are properties of. In general, Popper’s answer to this question is that they are
properties of something like the experimental situation or the experimental set-up. He writes, for instance,
that a propensity interpretation “introduces a dispositional property of singular physical experimental
arrangements – that is to say, of singular physical events” in interpreting probability (Popper 1983, 351). Or,
in more detail:
ey are not properties inherent in the die, or in the penny, but in something a little more
abstract, even though physically real: they are relational properties of the total objective
situation; hidden properties of a situation whose precise dependence on the situation we can
only conjecture. (Popper 1983, 359)
But just what exactly is the “total objective situation,” or the “singular physical experimental arrangement”?
is isn’t clearly dened at any point in Popper’s work. In a late lecture, gesturing at a very expansive
denition, he writes that propensities “are properties of the whole physical situation and sometimes even
of the particular way in which a situation changes” (Popper 1990, 17, original emphasis). Eagle interprets
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these broad invocations of “situation” as implying that “Popper seems to favour taking the entire state
of the universe to be the bearer of the propensity” (Eagle 2004, 380). at, it seems to me, goes too far
(Popper never strays from invoking either experimental set-ups or physical situations, both of which seem
smaller in extension than the entire universe) – but it is certainly the task of any fully eshed-out propensity
interpretation to decide just what the experimental set-up consists in, on pain of potential inconsistency
(see, e.g., Eagle 2004, 393–95, 405–6).
An intimately related question concerns repetition. Does an experimental set-up need to be repeated, or at
least guarantee the possibility of repetition, in order to instantiate a propensity? Popper again oers several
answers to this question – though here, as we will see below, I believe they can in the end be unied.
Let’s begin with Popper at his least restrictive, that is, his invocations of propensity that seem to indicate
that propensities exist even where there is no possibility for the repetition of the situation at issue. Popper
writes, for instance, that the assertion of a probability claim Pr(a ∣ b) = r is equivalent to “the assertion that
the conditions b produce a propensity r to realize the result a” (Popper 1983, 291). No explicit reference to
repetitions here, unless perhaps the notion of repetition is smuggled in via what it means to “produce a
propensity.” More explicitly, he writes elsewhere that the propensity interpretation may be summarized as
follows:
I propose to interpret the objective probability of a single event as a measure of an objective
propensity – of the strength of the tendency, inherent in the specied physical situation, to
realize the event – to make it happen. (Popper 1983, 395)
Here the propensity interpretation is given a denition that explicitly does not require repetition. e
tendency inherent in the situation to realize the event – to bring it about simpliciter, not to bring it about
multiple times or with a given long-run frequency – is identied with the propensity, and the probability at
issue is the measure of that propensity.
Elsewhere, however, Popper does seem to require that the situation is at least potentially repeatable. For
instance, he writes, by contrast with the claim above that a propensity is a disposition to realize a particular
outcome, that it is “the disposition (or whatever you may wish to call it) of the set-up to produce these
frequencies, if only the experiment is repeated suciently oen” (Popper 1983, 397, original emphasis).
In this case, then, it seems as though the possibility of repetition, and by extension the possibility to
produce the frequency (even if only counterfactually or virtually) is required in order for a propensity to
be expressed. At his most restrictive, he even writes that, among the sequences of random outcomes that
might be considered to be grounded by a propensity,
the only sequences to be admitted are those whichmay be described as repetitions of a situation
generating certain possible outcomes and which may be characterized by the method of their
generation, that is to say, by a generating set of experimental conditions. (Popper 1983, 360)
A possible way to square this apparent contradiction comes from Popper’s late work. He describes there a
distinction between the existence of a propensity and themeasurement of that same propensity, and considers
three dierent ways the relationship between them might look. e simplest case is that of our dice-rolling
set-up, which is indeed, both in principle and in practice, repeatable, and in which the experimental
conditions remain static across those repetitions. e propensity can thus be straightforwardly measured
by (virtual or actual) trials. A second case concerns instances in which the experimental conditions change
over the course of the experiment (he gives here the example of the Franck-Hertz experiment in physics,
Popper 1990, 15–16). Propensities in this case might still be measurable if we have, at each instance, a large
enough number of simultaneous trials, amounting to a kind of synchronic replacement for repetition. In a
third kind of cases, repetitions are entirely unavailable. It is worth quoting Popper at length:
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But in many kinds of events this is not the case, and the propensities cannot be measured
because the relevant situation changes and cannot be repeated.is would hold, for example, for
the dierent propensities of some of our evolutionary predecessors to give rise to chimpanzees
and to ourselves. Propensities of this kind are, of course, not measurable, since the situation
cannot be repeated. It is unique. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent us from supposing
that such propensities exist, and from estimating them speculatively. (Popper 1990, 17)
Such a distinction, therefore, between the existence of and the measurement of a propensity makes clearer
the role Popper has in mind for repetition. Popper’s later view seems to indicate that propensities themselves
ground a non-repeated tendency or disposition for a system to produce a given outcome, the rst kind
of approach we considered above; it is only in attempting to measure such propensities empirically that
repetition becomes important.
is question of whether or not repetition forms an essential part of the denition of a propensity interpreta-
tion has, in the years since Popper’s original proposal, been cashed out as a distinction between two dierent
kinds of propensity theories, which have come to be known as long-run and single-case propensity theories.
According to a long-run propensity theory (Eagle 2004, 377), a probability statement Pr(a ∣ b) = x is
equivalent to the claim that the experimental set-up b has a disposition to produce events of type a with the
frequency x in the long run, as the experiment is repeated – as Popper says above, “if only the experiment
is repeated suciently oen.”ese need not necessarily be actual repetitions of the experiment; Popper
talks oen about virtual or hypothetical sequences of trials. But the disposition of the experimental set-up
at issue would be one to produce a type of event over time.
On a single-case propensity theory, by contrast, we are instead considering a disposition of the experimental
set-up to produce one particular result when the trial is run on one particular occasion (Eagle 2004, 379). A
probability statement Pr(a ∣ b) = x is in this case equivalent to the claim that the experimental set-up b has
a disposition, the strength of which is measured by the value x, to produce the result a. It thus seems that,
at least at the time of his last works when he argues that repetition is entirely unnecessary to the existence of
propensities, Popper has adopted a single-case view, expressing (as he had said years earlier) the “tendency,
inherent in the specied physical situation, to realize the event” (Popper 1983, 395).
Another protable way to think about this dierence between long-run and single-case theories concerns
just what the dispositions at issue are dispositions to produce. On a long-run propensity theory, the
disposition of our die to land six is part of a very strong disposition to produce an entire given distribution
of frequencies in the long run of dice rolls. On a single-case theory, by contrast, our die has a rather weak
disposition to land six when thrown one time.
To sum up, then, there are a host of questions about the nature of the property implied in a propensity
interpretation of probability. How to understand the disposition at issue, what exactly it is a disposition of,
and whether or not it should be inherently connected with the idea of repetition all produce signicant
dierences in the “propensity interpretation” of probability that results. And, as Eagle noted, we can see
hints of a host of answers to these questions in various parts of Popper’s work.
5 Propensities and Probability Axioms
As with any reasonably venerable interpretation of probability, there are more potential problems with
a propensity interpretation than I could hope to canvass in a short chapter such as this one (see Eagle
2004, which oers twenty-one individual arguments against a variety of dierent versions of the propensity
interpretation), and many of these apply to Popper’s own development of propensity. In this section, I will
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consider two such objections – each of which has come to take on an outsized importance in the literature
on propensity interpretations more broadly – which cluster around the question of the relationship between
propensities and the mathematical formalization of probability theory.
Let’s begin with yet another way in which Popper formulated the propensity interpretation:
For propensities may be explained as possibilities (or as measures or ‘weights’ of possibilities)
which are endowed with tendencies or dispositions to realize themselves, and which are taken
to be responsible for the statistical frequencies with which they will in fact realize themselves
in long sequences of repetitions of an experiment. (Popper 1983, 350)
e rst objection to propensity interpretations concerns the leap here from “measures or ‘weights’ of
possibilities” to “statistical frequencies.” For probabilities – thatwhich a propensity interpretation is supposed
to interpret – are not any arbitrary measure or set of weights on possibilities. Probability is a tightly dened,
axiomatized, mathematical theory, and as a large literature has shown us, conformity with those axioms
seems to be necessary if we want to link probability with rational decision making, betting, and its other
various uses. e worry, then, is the following: how can we guarantee that the probabilities manifested by a
propensity will in fact adhere to the axioms of probability theory (Hájek 2019; Eagle 2004, 384–85)?
It should be obvious enough that nothing guarantees such an adherence in advance, on Popper’s view. A
system could be disposed to produce outcomes in any way we can imagine, including innitely many ways
that would violate the axioms of probability theory. It thus seems that we are owed some kind of account of
why it is that the resulting frequencies behave in such a reliable and regular manner.
One response oered by post-Popperian propensity theorists notes that this problem only arises if we accept
what Mauricio Suárez has called the “identity thesis” – that is, the claim that every probability (including
every conditional probability) is a propensity, and every propensity can be expressed as a conditional
probability. Popper’s presentation, as we have seen, certainly adopts such a thesis – he has argued that
all subjective interpretations of probability are incoherent, and that all coherent objective interpretations
reduce to the propensity interpretation. He has also consistently phrased propensities themselves as an
ascription of a conditional probability, Pr(a ∣ b), where b represents the experimental set-up – that is, the
object of which the propensity is said to be a property.
If we reject the identity thesis, what does the resulting propensity interpretation look like? Suárez’s own
preferred alternative involves taking propensity-grounded probabilities to be primitive, non-conditional
(this point will be important later) manifestations of those dispositions. When we say, that is, that our
dice-rolling set-up has a propensity to land six, just what we mean is that the propensity manifests as
a non-conditional probability of 1/6 to land six, Pr(s) = 1/6.7 ere is no further interpretation of this
manifestation relationship to search for – if we have a disposition that manifests itself as a single-case,
objective probability, we have a propensity, and vice-versa (Suárez 2014, 229). e appropriate relationship
to envision between those objective probabilities and propensities, rather than identity, is something
like “explanatory grounding” (Suárez 2018, 1172–773): propensities ground and explain the appearance of
objective probabilities.
Whatever we might think about the merits of Suárez’s approach, the move here is clear enough – sever the
tight link between the behavior of propensities and the resulting objective probabilities, and we will no
longer need to look to the behavior of those propensities to reproduce the Kolmogorov axioms. Whether
or not the long-run frequencies of trials of the kind of set-ups that Suárez describes behave according to
7As he claries in Suárez (2018), it is perhaps better to index the probability function with the propensity to indicate the fact
that the probability depends upon the propensity without being a conditional probability, Pr f (s) = 1/6).
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the axioms of probability theory is an empirical matter for experimental statistics.
e second argument that I want to consider for the moment is a closely related one, due to Paul Humphreys,
and again concerns the conditional probability statements that result from a propensity interpretation. One
way of interpreting Bayes’ theorem,




is as establishing a way in which we can “reverse” conditional probabilities. Given a value for Pr(a ∣ b), we
can straightforwardly enough calculate the value of Pr(b ∣ a). But, as Humphreys (1985) notes, it seems
as though since many propensities describe causal connections, we will oen have cases where Pr(a ∣ b)
is reasonably interpreted as a propensity, but Pr(b ∣ a) is not. Return to our dice-throwing example. It is
reasonable enough to imagine that the experimental set-up for rolling the fair die is disposed to result in a six
one-sixth of the time. But it seems unreasonable, by contrast, to think that there is a dispositional property
for a “landing six” to have been produced by the experimental set-up at issue. Yet if every conditional
probability is grounded in a propensity, this conclusion seems to be an inescapable consequence of Bayes’
theorem – whenever Pr(s ∣ f ) has a value, Pr( f ∣ s) has a value as well.
ere are a variety of ways to respond to this argument. To mention only two, Humphreys himself asserted
that “it is to be taken as a reason for rejecting the current theory of probability as the correct theory of
chance” (Humphreys 1985, 557). Propensities, that is, are to be preserved even at the cost of replacing the
Kolmogorov axioms as our formalism for objective probability. Turn now to Suárez, who has all the tools he
needs to respond to Humphreys given his position as we’ve seen it above. Most importantly, he has already
rejected the crucial premise in Humphreys’s argument that every conditional probability is grounded in
a propensity (part of his “identity thesis”). And the correct account of the probabilities that arise from
propensities, Suárez writes, is not a conditional probability, so no question of “reversing” those conditional
probabilities even arises.
To sum up, we might briey put these two objections as follows. On the one hand, the mathematical
apparatus of probability theory is quite tightly constrained, and these constraints are essential to the utility
of probability as a concept and its relationships with other elds. On the other hand, the notion of a
propensity, when loosely dened as little more than either a disposition to produce a given outcome (single-
case theories) or a disposition to produce frequencies of a type of outcome in a series of trials (long-run
theories), is hardly constrained at all. A relatively sophisticated story is required to demonstrate how the
two are related, and while Popper himself seems not to have noticed that this was so, a number of such
approaches are now available in the literature.
6 Doingings with Propensities
To close, I want to briey introduce one way in which the propensity interpretation has proven useful for
philosophical work outside of the interpretation of probability. My example comes from the philosophy of
biology and, in particular, work on understanding the notion of evolutionary tness. Popper himself, in
discussing how the propensity interpretation of probability did not fall prey to the same kinds of charges
of superuousness that could be levied against vital forces, wrote that, unlike the relative theoretical and
empirical uselessness of vital forces, propensities are dierent:8
8Popper’s relationship to evolutionary theory more broadly is relatively complex. For his mature thoughts on natural selection,
see the (extremely interesting) Popper (1978) and Popper (1990), as well as chapter (CROSS REFERENCE TO POPPER-DARWIN
CHAPTER) of this volume.
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But the disposition, or tendency, or propensity of most organisms to struggle for survival is
not a barren conception, but a very useful one; and the barrenness of the idea of a vital force
seems to be due to the fact that it promises to add, but fails to add, something important to
the assertion that most organisms show a propensity to struggle for survival and, in doing so,
develop other propensities, like that of investigating their surroundings, and occupying new
ecological niches.” (Popper 1983, 358)
While Popper’s invocation of the “struggle for survival” is somewhat anachronistic with respect to con-
temporary evolutionary theory, there is a vague premonition here of something that would come to be
called (indeed, by 1983 when Popper’s work was published in a revised version, had already been called) the
propensity interpretation of tness. Since Herbert Spencer rst convinced Darwin to include the phrase
in the h edition of e Origin of Species, natural selection has been described as “the survival of the
ttest” – those properties which render some organisms better able to meet the challenges posed by their
environments than others can be briey summed up with the term “tness.” Fitter organisms will tend to
outcompete the less t, precisely because more of their ospring will be likely to survive to adulthood and
reproduce.
All this talk of likelihood and tendency led a number of philosophers to consider the possibility that tness
is itself a propensity. If tness is simply equated with the number of ospring that an organism actually
has, then any explanation involving tness becomes circular: the fact that an organism had more ospring
cannot explain its success in having more ospring. If, on the other hand, organisms have propensities to
produce various numbers of ospring, then those propensities can form part of an explanation for why
a given number of ospring was in fact seen – just in the way that a die’s being biased toward six (that is,
its having a stronger propensity to land six) can oer a partial explanation for the appearance of a six on
the next throw. In this sense, the propensity interpretation of probability could prove incredibly useful for
understanding some of the foundational concepts of evolutionary biology.
at said, there is still much work to do in determining what the connection between a propensity inter-
pretation of probability and a propensity interpretation of tness should look like.9 In what follows, I will
largely track my own work with Grant Ramsey on the propensity interpretation of tness (henceforth PIF,
Pence and Ramsey 2013). While it is somewhat idiosyncratic, I think it clearly demonstrates the potential
for propensities to shed light on thorny philosophical problems.
First, there are multiple uses of tness in the biology literature which are applied to dierent kinds of objects
– traits, organisms, and populations, at the very least. e PIF that I will consider here is a propensity
interpretation of the tness of individual organisms. While we might connect this individual tness to both
the tness of traits and the tness of populations (see Pence 2021), we have argued (Pence and Ramsey
2015) that individual tness is in fact fundamental to all such uses.
Second, over what kinds of outcomes is the PIF dened, to which it will ascribe probability values? On
our view, it is the probability that an individual organism has to give rise to dierent kinds of daughter
populations or lineages that matters for our use of tness. Some possible futures for our organism see it
dying young before having any ospring at all, while others see it giving rise to a lineage that spreads, taking
9Isabelle Drouet and Francesca Merlin argue that “tness is not a propensity in the sense that ‘propensity’ has in the Popperian
interpretation of singular probabilities, and the claim that tness is a propensity can be understood only loosely” (Drouet and
Merlin 2015, 467). Unfortunately, they do so only on the basis of a very early version of the propensity interpretation of tness
(Mills and Beatty 1979), which characterized the nature of the probabilities involved in ascriptions of tness in several incompatible
ways. ey also ascribe (only) a single-case theory of propensities to Popper, and argue that “no later development [of his view]
diers from this orthodoxy” in a way that would make a dierence, a claim that I think is clearly rendered problematic by the
discussion so far (Drouet and Merlin 2015, 458).
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over its population. We want to know how likely or unlikely it is that each of these possibilities comes to
pass.
Importantly, a full PIF will include both an ascription of probabilities over outcomes (which justies our
calling it a “propensity” interpretation) and ameasure over those outcomes that describes individual success
(which justies our calling it an “interpretation of tness”). I will not discuss the latter question of the
appropriate measure over those daughter populations here. Intuitively, it is something like their size, though
a variety of technical quibbles mean that this account needs to be rendered signicantly more sophisticated.
e PIF oered in Pence and Ramsey (2013), then, hopes to be an interpretation of tness that fulls two
main desiderata. On the one hand, it successfully takes account of a variety of features of biological practice
(for instance, the relations between dierent mathematical models used in various parts of evolutionary
biology). And on the other hand, it does so while responding to a variety of putative counterexamples to
other notions of tness that had been previously advanced by philosophers of science.
But this now leads us to the same problems that we’ve already seen earlier in the chapter. First, advocates of
the PIF have yet to present an account of dispositional properties that could ground the relevant dispositions
at issue, although this is a problem that I hope to take up in future work.
Next, what exactly is the experimental set-up on which the PIF’s propensities depend, and is it repeatable?
In prior work, we dened the set-up conditions as being pairs of environment and genotype. is, however,
makes the question of repetition acute – an organism’s having a particular genotype in a particular environ-
ment is certainly an unrepeatable event. As we saw above, Popper argued that if the relevant situation is
genuinely unique, then the propensity which results will be unmeasurable, not a desirable outcome for a
concept like tness. It seems that we need to expand on Popper’s idea that multiple, similar, synchronic
trials (for instance, cloning experiments) might be able to take the place of repetition in the measurement
of the PIF’s propensities (some discussion of this problem can be found in Pence and Ramsey 2015).
Finally, it is noteworthy that as the lineages to which organisms give rise are produced over time, those very
lineages interact with and change the experimental set-up – genotypes and environments in the future are
assuredly not identical to genotypes and environments in the present. Popper himself briey considered
the question of changing conditions, as we saw, in a particular experimental case in physics. But the nature
of propensities in changing set-ups is a question that assuredly needs further exploration by advocates of
the PIF.10
To conclude, then, we’ve seen that Popper, responding to diculties with long-run frequency and subjective
theories of probability as applied to reasoning in fundamental physics, turned to an interpretation on
which probabilities arise as a result of dispositional properties or tendencies held by experimental set-
ups, the propensity interpretation. Such an interpretation requires that we ll in a variety of interpretive
gaps in Popper’s original presentation, and engage with a number of objections. But the potential payo
is signicant – as we have seen, propensities have the capacity to illuminate the nature of probabilistic
reasoning across the sciences.
References
Carnap, Rudolf. 1962. Logical Foundations of Probability. Second. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Choi, Sungho. 2011. “Finkish Dispositions and Contextualism.”e Monist 94 (1): 103–20. https://doi.org/
10.5840/monist20119416.
10I thank Robert Brandon for raising this potential objection.
12
Drouet, Isabelle, and Francesca Merlin. 2015. “e Propensity Interpretation of Fitness and the Propensity
Interpretation of Probability.” Erkenntnis 80: 457–68. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9681-2.
Eagle, Antony. 2004. “Twenty-One Arguments Against Propensity Analyses of Probability.” Erkenntnis 60
(3): 371–416. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023408.61887.6a.
Fuchs, Christopher A., and Asher Peres. 2000. “Quantumeory Needs No ‘Interpretation’.” Physics Today
53 (3): 70. https://doi.org/10.1063/1.883004.
Hájek, Alan. 2019. “Interpretations of Probability.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward
N. Zalta.
Humphreys, Paul. 1985. “Why Propensities Cannot Be Probabilities.” Philosophical Review 94 (4): 557–70.
Jerey, Richard C. 2004. Subjective Probability: e Realing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kolmogorov, A. N. 1933. Foundations of theeory of Probability. New York: Chelsea.
Lewis, David. 1980. “A Subjectivist’s Guide toObjective Chance.” In Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability,
edited by Richard C. Jerey, 2:263–93. Berkeley: University of California Press.
———. 1997. “Finkish Dispositions.” Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187): 143–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
9213.00052.
Mills, Susan K., and John H. Beatty. 1979. “e Propensity Interpretation of Fitness.” Philosophy of Science
46 (2): 263–86. https://doi.org/10.1086/288865.
Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1932. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. 2: Elements of Logic. Edited by
Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pence, Charles H. 2021. e Causal Structure of Natural Selection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pence, Charles H., and Grant Ramsey. 2013. “ANew Foundation for the Propensity Interpretation of Fitness.”
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4): 851–81. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axs037.
———. 2015. “Is Organismic Fitness at the Basis of Evolutionary eory?” Philosophy of Science 82 (5):
1081–91. https://doi.org/10.1086/683442.
Popper, Karl R. 1957. “Probability Magic, or Knowledge Out of Ignorance.” Dialectica 11 (3-4): 354–74.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1957.tb01643.x.
———. 1959. “e Propensity Interpretation of Probability.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10
(37): 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/X.37.25.
———. 1978. “Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind.” Dialectica 32 (3–4): 339–55.
———. 1983. Realism and the Aim of Science. London: Routledge.
———. 1990. AWorld of Propensities. Bristol: oemmes Press.
———. 1992. e Logic of Scientic Discovery. London: Routledge.
Suárez, Mauricio. 2014. “A Critique of Empiricist Propensityeories.” European Journal for Philosophy of
Science 4 (2): 215–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-014-0083-8.
———. 2018. “e Chances of Propensities.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4): 1155–77.
https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx010.
13
